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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
STATE OF GEORGIA

UNITED SCIENCES, LLC; ONE SCIENCES,
INC.; WESS ERIC SHARPE; RONALD E,
STEWART; RUIZHI HONG; ROD MCAFEE;
JAMES RAUBOLT; IGOR MILCHMAN; and
similarly situated Minority Shareholders of
United Sciences, LLC,

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.
2020CV332546

Plaintiffs,

Business Case Division 4
V.

SAMUEL KELLETT, SR.; SBK CAPITAL,
LLC; SAMUEL KELLETT,JR.; GREGORY
ANDERSON; ARTOUSH OHANIAN;
ROBERT JOSEPH; HILL KERTSCHER &
WHARTON, LLP; MICHAELR. SMITH;
KING & SPALDING, LLP; GERARD G.
PECHT; NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT,LLP;
JOELLE SHARMAN; and LEWIS BRISBOI
BISGAARD SMITH, LLP,
Defendants.

ORDER ON VARIOUS MOTIONS

The above-styled dispute concerning the control ofa limitedliability company hasa long,
convolutedhistory. It comes before the Court on a numberof motions including:
(1) Defendant Gregory Anderson’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint and
Responseto Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment,filed July 30, 2020 (earlier motion
filed March 9, 2020);
(2) Defendants Joelle C. Sharman’s and Lewis, Brisbois, Bisgaard & Smith, LLP’s Motionto
Dismiss and/orStrike and Motion forBill of Peace, filed July 30, 2020 (earlier motion

filed March 11, 2020);

(3) Defendant Mr. Artoush Ohanian’s Supplement and Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice,
filed July 30, 2020 (earlier motion filed April 17, 2020);

(4) Defendant Mr. SamuelB. Kellett, Jr.’s Supplement and Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice,
filed July 30, 2020 (earlier motionfiled April 17, 2020);

(5) Robert R. Joseph and Hill, Kertscher & Wharton, LLP’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’
First Amended Complaint, filed July 30, 2020:

(6) Gerard G. Pecht and Norton Rose Fulbright US, LLP’s Motionto Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, filed July 30, 2020;

(7) Gerard G. Pecht and Norton Rose Fulbright US, LLP’s Motionto Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First

Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim,filed July 30, 2020:

(8) SBK Capital, LLC’s Motionto Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, filed August
3, 2020, and

(9) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment onPlaintiffs’ Claim for Declaratory Judgment
against Defendant Samuel Kellett, Jr., filed July 14, 2020 and amended onJuly 15, 2020.

Having reviewed the record and considered the submissions of counsel andoral arguments that
occurred during an October 26, 2020 hearing, the Court enters the following order.
1. BACKGROUND

A. Underlying Facts!
i,

Sharpe Commences Leadership ofthe Company

* The Court’s statement of facts was prepared by considering the factual allegations of the Plaintiffs’ pleadings
in a
light most favorable to Plaintiffs and granting them every reasonable inference as if the Court were considering
a
motion to dismiss forfailure to state a claim under O.C.G.A. § 9-1 1-12(b)(6). Hill v. Bd. of Regents
of the Uniy. Sys.
of Ga., 351 Ga. App. 455 (2019)(in reviewing a motionto dismiss forfailure to state a claim, courts must
consider as
true “all well-pled material allegations in the complaint and must resolve anydoubtsin favorof the
plaintiff”) Many
of the issues presented in the various motions are rooted inthis statute. However, the Court recognizes
that several of
the motions raise other issues where the Court’s considerationis notrestricted to the pleadings, e.g. an
anti-SLAPP
motion to strike pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-1 1-11.1, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(1), and a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction O.C.G.A.
§ 9-11-12(b)(2).

When the Courtis considering an issue whereits review is not restricted to the pleadings, it will so note.
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In 2012 Samuel B. Kellett, Jr. invited Wess Eric Sharpe to become CEO of a Georgia
limited liability company that eventually became United Sciences, LCC (the “Company”). (FAC,
44 26, 28-29, 42.)? In April 2012, shortly after becoming CEO, Sharpe informed Kellett, Jr. he

had a felony conviction for aggravated assault involving a family incident that occurred many
years prior when Sharpe was a teenager.

(FAC, ff] 29-30.)

Sharpe and Kellett, Jr. had a rocky relationship, and Sharpe quickly left the Company.
(FAC, {| 32.) However, Kellett, Jr. asked Sharpe to return, and, before doing so, Sharpe made
certain demands which led the Company to adopt a new managementstructure and operating
agreement (“Operating Agreement”)?

(FAC, 4 32-33.) The Company would be manager-

managedbut havea board ofdirectors. (FAC, §]35; Operating Agreement, § 6.1.) Sharpe would
serve as its manager and CEO as well as a director whereas Kellett, Jr. would be a director and

chairmanof the Company’s board. (FAC, § 35.) Pursuant to Sharpe’s demands, the Operating
Agreement contained certain provisions intended to protect himfromanabrupt ouster. (FAC, {f]
33-34.)

Sharpe would “permanently hold” a seat onthe board for so long as he owned 3%ofthe

Company. (Operating Agreement, § 6.3.) The Operating Agreement allowed for Sharpe to be

removedasa directorfor cause which wasdefinedto include a “conviction of . . . a crime involving
moral turpitude.” (Operating Agreement, § 6.8(a).)* Sharpe believed a 30-day notice provision
? The initial complaint filed on January 31, 2020 will be referred to as the “Original Complaint” and the First Amended
Complaint, filed June 30, 2020, will be referred to as the “FAC”.

> The Operating Agreementis attached to the First Amended Complaint as Exhibit B and will hereinafter be cited
as the “Operating Agreement.”
* In pertinentpart, Operating Agreement, § 6.8(a) provides:

Anydirector may be removed bythe remainderof the Board ofDirectors for Cause. “Cause” in this Section
6.8(a) has the meaning given to such term in any Employment Agreement between the Company and such
person, ifany exists. In the absence of such definition in an Employment Agreement, “Cause”, with respect
to any Director other than Kellett or Wess Eric Sharpe means(a) an indictment ora conviction for any felony
offense or any other crime involving dishonesty involving the Company, (b) participation in any fraud,theft
or embezzlement or other material misconduct involving the Company, (c) intentional damage to any
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foundin the removal provision regarding directors would apply to him. (Id.; FAC, J 46, 48.)
The
Operating Agreement allowed the manager to be removed with or without cause, but it required
all directors to be present at any meeting where his removal was being addressed.

(FAC 9] 47;

Operating Agreement, § 6.8(b).)

The Company’s primary product involved technology that could scan a person’s ear and
help with the personalization of hearing aids. (FAC, 431.) Plaintiffs claim that, during Sharpe’s
tenure, the Company developed technology that was “groundbreaking” and could prove quite
lucrative. (FAC, 9 51-52, 276.)

ii.

Sharpe's Removal

Kellett, Jr. began to undermine Sharpe’s leadership, andthe complaint lists examples of
self-dealing Kellett, Jr. used to enrich himself and his family, particularly his father, Samuel
Kellett, Sr.

(FAC, 9] 53-78.) Sharpe confronted Kellett, Jr., and, by the end of 2013, Kellett, Jr.

was aware that Sharpe “was determined to block his efforts to raid [the Company] for his
own
benefit and that ofhis father.” (FAC, 79.) Kellett, Jr. then orchestrated a plan to remove Sharpe

from all his roles in the Company andtake control ofits management(the “removal”). (FAC, 9
79-80, 277.)

Considering the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Kellett, Jr.

enlisted or was aided by a number of conspirators in his removal efforts, and all were
aware of his

property ofthe Company,(d) breachof the duties of good faith andfair dealing that are owed to the
Company
(e) breach orviolation of any employment, confidentiality, non-competition, nonsolicitation
or assignment
of inventions agreement, (f) use of controlled dangerous substances or abuse of prescriptio
n medications, on
Company premises or at a Companyfunctionor(g)failure to comply with written policies of the
Company
that have been approved by the Board of Directors, or insubordination orfailure to follow
the directions of
the Board of Directors or the Managerof the Company where for any suchviolation underthis Section
6.8(a)
thirty days written notice is received by the applicable Manager[sic] and the recipient fails to
cure within
such thirty day period. With respect to Kellett or Wess Eric Sharpe, “Cause”shall mean
(i) theft or
embezzlement of Company’s property;(ii) fraud;(iii) conviction of fraud, theft, embezzlement
or a crime
involving moral turpitude.
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intent to remove Sharpe fromhis roles in the Companyso that Kellett, Jr.’s self-dealing could
continue unhindered.
Kellett, Jr. borrowed $100,000 from his Mother, Gregory Anderson, to hire Gerard G.
Pecht of Norton Rose Fulbright, LLP, a Texas-based lawyer andfirm, for legal assistance in
accomplishing the removal.

(FAC, §{ 87-88, 256 (h), (i) and (j).)

Kellett, Jr. then used his

authority under the Operating Agreementto increase the size of the board, fill the new vacancies
withfriendly directors who he promised to rewardandintimidate those directors he feared might
not cooperate with his plan. (FAC, {ff 81-92, 149.) One of the friendly directors appointed by
Kellett, Jr. was his childhood friend, Artoush Ohanian. (FAC, 481.) OnFriday, January 31, 2014,
Kellett, Jr. gave one hour’s notice of a board meeting for the purpose ofdiscussing general
company business andthe introduction of new board members. (FAC, ff 93-94.) Duringthe fourminute meeting, conductedvia conference call, Kellett, Jr. announced his board appointments and

successfully called for a vote to schedule another meeting forthe following Monday, February3,
2014. (FAC, ff 95-96.) A few minuteslater, Kellett, Jr. sent an email outlining the agenda for
the Monday meeting which included Sharpe’s possible removal as the Company’s manager.

(FAC, § 97.)
Overthe ensuing weekend, Sharpe emailedhis protests to the Company’s counsel, Robert
Joseph, andall its directors, accusing Kellett, Jr. of self-dealing and complaining this removal
process violated the Operating Agreement. (FAC, § 99.) Asreflected in the Original Complaint,
on February 2, 2014, Sharpe terminated Joseph as Companycounsel ashefelt Joseph haddivided
loyalties between the Companyand Kellett, Jr. (Original Complaint, § 263.) Sharpe hired a new

attorney to represent the Companyat the February 3, 2014 meeting but refusedto attend himself,
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claiming the Operating Agreement would not allow his removal unless he was present
for the
meeting. (FAC, J§ 99-103.)
During the February 3, 2014 meeting, the Company attorney designated by
Sharpe
complained the meeting had not been properly noticed. (FAC, 4 104.) Pecht then
advised the
meeting could “move forward” whiclit did: (FAC, { 105;OriginalComplaint, Ex.
140203-3, p.
7.) Kellett, Jr. conducteda roll call and then representedhe had recently obtained evidenc
e Sharpe
was a convicted felon who had served timeinjail which Kellett, Jr. falsely claimed
Sharpe had
previously failed to disclose. (FAC, § 106.)

He also intimated that Sharpe had attended a

Company-sponsoredhuntingtrip with other employeesand, dueto his status as a convicte
d felon,
illegally carried a gun. (FAC,

107.)

unanimously approved by the board.

Sharpe’s removal as a director, manager, and CEO was
(FAC, 4 108.)

Pecht then made the following

pronouncement: “[I]et the record reflect that Sharpe has been voted out ofoffice by
the Board of
Directors out of his position as CEO, manageranddirector. He has been voted
out for Cause.”
(FAC, § 109; Original Complaint, Ex. 140203-3, p. 13.)

Then Kellett, Jr. was unanimously

installed as the Company’s manager, and Sharpe was banned from the Company
’s premises.

(FAC, f§ 110-113.)
In orderto quell unrest at the Company caused bythe removal, Kellett, Jr,
Ohanian, and
Joseph allegedly made misrepresentations to the minority shareholders that the
board had strictly
complied withall procedures in conducting the removal. (FAC, {J 114, 222.)
Additionally, they
madeother misstatements about Sharpeto the minority owners, including a claimhe
hadlied about
his criminal history.

(FAC, $9 114, 222-224.)

Kellett, Jr., with Ohanian’s assistance, began a

“purge” of Company personnel and fired those he viewed as loyal to Sharpe. (FAC,
§§ 129-135.)

Plaintiffs allege Sharpe’s removal andthese firings “caused a massive brain drain
that cratered the
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Company.” (FAC, 4138.) Further, after taking control of the Company,Kellett, Jr. failed to pay
employees and vendors, damaged key deals favoring the Company, diminished the value ofthe
Company’s intellectual property, and diluted the equity of the other owners by issuing large
amounts of equity to himself, his family, his other businesses, and his co-conspirators. (FAC, {J
139-149.) Joseph is alleged to have aided Kellett, Jr.’s post-removal efforts by amending the
Company’s articles of organization withoutauthority. (FAC, {J 256(g), 281.)
iii,

Ensuing Litigation Involving Sharpe's Removal

Shortly after his removal, Sharpe sued Kellett, Jr. in the Superior Court of Fulton County
wherein he unsuccessfully sought a temporaryrestraining order enjoining his removal and other
relief, United Sciences LLC, et al. v. Samuel B. Kellett, Jr., et al. Civil Action No. 2014C.V242263

(“Case No. 2263"). Among the named defendants were Kellett, Jr. and Ohanian as well as other
membersofthe board. On February 21, 2014, Pecht appeared in personto defendKellett, Jr. and
other director defendants. (FAC, J 256(k); Original Complaint, Ex. 140221-1.) In the midst of
this litigation, Michael Smith of the law firm King and Spalding, LLC senta letter demanding
return of a Company laptop.

(FAC, J 116.) The docket reflects Smith also represented the

Company in Case No. 2263.

Case No. 2263 ended on April 25, 2014, when Sharpefiled a

voluntary dismissal without prejudice. However, manydifferent lawsuits about Sharpe’s removal
would follow.
OnJuly 22, 2014, Sharpe filed a lawsuit against Kellett, Jr., Wess Eric Sharpe v. Samuel
Kellett, Jr., State Court of Fulton County, Civil Action No. 14EV001603 (“Case No. 1603”).

(FAC, § 121.) Kellett, Jr. retained Joelle Sharman ofthe law firm Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard Smith,
LLP to represent him. (Id.) On June 15, 2014, before Case No. 1603 was resolved, Kellett, Jr.

filed a suit individually and on behalf of the Company against Sharpe in the Superior Court of
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Fulton County, Samuel B. Kellett, Jr., individually and on behalf of United Sciences, LLC v. Wess

Eric Sharpe, Civil Action No. 2015CV262052 (Case No. 2052). (FAC, § 122.) In Case No. 2052,
Kellett, Jr. was initially represented by Sharman, and on November 16, 2015, Sharman
successfully obtained an order allowing the Companyto be substituted as the sole Plaintiff in the
action. (FAC, { 123.) Thereafter, Sharman represented the Company. (Id.) Sharpe alleges
Anderson, Kellett, Jr.’s mother, prevented her then husband, Taz Anderson, from offering
favorable testimony about Sharpe in Case No. 1603 or Case No. 2052. (FAC, §] 127.)

Thelitigation mentionedin the First Amended Complaint is only a portionof thelitigation
stemming from Sharpe’s removal as Sharpe filed numerous other lawsuits against different
defendants on this issue. As he acknowledged in the Original Complaint, Sharpe voluntarily
dismissed four such complaints on January 14, 2020, shortly before filing the original complaint
in this action.> Accordingly, considering Case No. 2263 and these four later lawsuits, Sharpe has

voluntarily dismissed fiveprior actionshe filed contesting his removal.
B. Procedural History of the Present Action.

tv

1.

Wess Eric Sharpe v. Clay W. Tippins, Craig E. Jones and Capgemini U.S., LLC, State Court of Fulton
County, Civil Action No. 18EV000491, Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice, filed January 14,
2020. (Original Complaint, Ex. 200114-1.)
Wess Eric Sharpe v. Georgia Hatzilias, Karol Hatzilias, Stephen Kendrick, and Jennifer S. Kellett, State

eo

Court of Fulton County, Civil Action No. 18EV000495, Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice,filed
January 14, 2020. (Original Complaint, Ex. 2000114-2.)
Wess Eric Sharpe v. Robert B. Joseph and Hill, Kertscher & Wharton, LLP, State Court of Fulton

County, Civil Action No. 18EV000557, Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice, filed January 14, 2020.
(Original Complaint, Ex. 200114-3.)
4.

Wess Eric Sharpe v. King & Spalding, LLP. William G. Roche, and Michael R. Smith, State Court of
Fulton County, Civil Action File No. 19EV000624, Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice, filed
January 14, 2020. (Original Complaint, Ex. 200114-4.)
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OnJanuary 31, 2020, Plaintiffs filed the Original Cmplaint. It was 808 paragraphs long and
contained hundredsofpages in exhibits.

It drew a numberof motionsto dismiss. On April 22,

2020, the case wastransferred to the Metro Atlanta Business Case Division. On April 27, 2020,
newcounsel substituted for the non-SharpePlaintiffs. They requestedthe pending motionsbeheld
in abeyance while they re-drafted the Original Complaint. On June, 5, 2020, the Court entered a
Preliminary Scheduling Order, setting deadlines for the amended complaint and allowing the new
motionsto befiled or the supplementation of pending motionsthereafter. As a result, on June 30,
2020, the First Amended Complaint wasfiled. Certain Defendants were voluntarily dismissed,
and the thirteen remaining Defendants filed new motions and/or supplemented their earlier
motions to dismiss and/orstrike.
The Plaintiffs include Sharpe and the Company, whohasfiled this action pursuantto Sharpe’s
purported authority as the Company’s manager.

The remaining Plaintiffs are six minority

shareholders. (FAC, {{] 2-7.) These minority shareholders sue ontheir own behalf, but they also
seek to serve as representatives for a class of similarly situated minority owners. (FAC, qf] 150156.) While all Plaintiffs joined in this one action, Sharpe lodges four claims solely in his own
name. He doesnotjoin with the otherPlaintiffs in asserting any claims.
The Defendants can be segregatedinto three different groups,thefirst being friends and family
ofKellett, Jr. including his father, his father’s business, his mother, and Ohanian. The second

group of Defendants are attorneys, Joseph, who worked for the Company orassisted Kellett, Jr.
around the time of the removal and Pecht who gave counselassisting in Sharpe’s removal. The
final group of Defendants are also attorneys, Shaman and Smith. They defended the Company

® Responsein Opposition to Defendants Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP and Joelle C. Sharman’s Motionto
Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint for Damages and MotionforBill of Peace, filed September 30, 2020,
p. 14.
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against Sharpe’s claimsafter the removal occurred. The lawfirms ofJoseph, Pecht, Sharman, and
Smith are also named as Defendants and are allegedly liable “either for participating directly or
under a theory of respondeat superior.” (FAC, § 176.)

The non-Sharpe Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that Sharpe’s termination was invalid
and he remains the Company’s legal manager. (FAC, Count 1.) The non-SharpePlaintiffs lodge
several counts against all Defendants claiming they aided and abetted or conspiredwith Kellett,
Jr. to breach his fiduciary duties to the Company, bothin regard to the removal of Sharpe and in
his subsequent actions. (FAC, Counts 2 and 3.) They makesimilarallegations all Defendants
aided and abetted and conspired with Kellett, Jr. to breach the Operating Agreement in removing
Sharpe. (FAC, Counts 4 and 5.) The non-Sharpe Plaintiffs further claim all Defendants were part
of a RICO enterprise to deprive the minority owners oftheir interests in the Company. (FAC,
Count 8.) They also accuse Kellett, Jr., his father, and his father’s companyof RICO violations

stemming from particular incidents ofself-dealing. (FAC, Count 7.) The non-Sharpe Plaintiffs
also accuse Kellett, Jr., Ohanian, and Josephoffraud stemming fromalleged representations they
made to the minority shareholders in the wake of Sharpe’s removal. (FAC, Count6.)
Sharpe has brought fourclaimssolely against Joseph, Smith, and theirrespective lawfirms for
aiding and abetting and conspiring with Kellett, Jr. to breachhis fiduciary duties and the Operating
Agreement. (FAC, Counts 9 through 12.)
Pending before the Court are eight motions to dismiss, including one motionto dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction. Includedin one ofthe motions to dismiss is a motionto strike based
on O.C.G.A.§ 9-11-11.1, Georgia’s anti-SLAPPstatute. The non-SharpePlaintiffhave also filed
a motion for summary judgment solely on Count | seeking a declaratory judgmentregarding the
propriety of Sharpe’s removal.
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2. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION FILED
BY DEFENDANTS PECHT AND NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
Pechtand his firm move to dismiss, contending this Court lacks personal jurisdiction.
“Whena defendant movesto dismiss forlack ofpersonal jurisdiction, he has the burdenof proving
that he is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court.” Weathers v. Dieniahmar Music, LLC, 337
Ga. App. 816, 819-820 (2016). When, as here, the motion[is] decided on the basis of written
submissions alone, “any disputes offact in the written submissions supporting and opposing the
motionto dismiss are resolved in favorofthe party asserting personaljurisdiction.” Home Depot
Supply, Inc. v. Hunter Mgmt. LLC, 289 Ga. App. 286 (2008).
Underthe first prong of Georgia’s Long-Arm Statute, a Georgia court may properly
exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-resident who, “[t]ransacts any business within this
state...” O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1). Pecht argues he onlyparticipated in one meeting via a telephone
call.

In Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs. v. First Natl. Bank of Ames, 279 Ga. 672, 675

(2005), the Georgia Supreme Court overruled a line of cases that minimizedthe import of a nonresident’s intangible contacts with Georgia.

Instead, it foundthis portion of the long-armstatute

should be construed according to its plain language -- supporting jurisdiction over a non-resident
whotransacts “any”business within the State -- while noting jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 9-1091(1) could not exceed the bounds of due process. The mandates of due processare met if an
individual has “fair warning that a particular activity may subject them to the jurisdiction of a
foreign sovereign.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Beasley v. Beasley, 260 Ga. 419, 421
(1990).

A three-part test guides this Court’s consideration as to whether a non-resident can

reasonably anticipate subjecting himself to the jurisdiction of Georgia courts.
Jurisdiction exists on the basis of transacting business in this state if (1) the nonresident

defendant has purposefully done some act or consummated sometransaction inthis state,
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(2) if the cause of actionarises fromoris connected with suchactortransaction, and (3) if
the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts ofthis state does not offendtraditional fairness
and substantial justice. (Footnote omitted.)
Aero Toy Store, LLC v. Grieves, 279 Ga. App. 515, 517-518 (2006). “Weanalyze thefirst two
prongsof this test to determine whether a defendant has established the minimum contacts with
the forum state necessary forthe exercise of jurisdiction. And if such minimum contacts are found,
we then analyze the third prong. (Footnote omitted.)” Weathers at 820. In sum, for Georgia to

exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident, it “must have directed [its] activities at residents of the
forum, and thelitigation must result from the alleged injuries that arise out of orrelate to those
activities. (Citation omitted.)” Stanton v. Harris, 2020 WL 5269295, at **2 (Ga. App., Sept. 4,

2020).
Pecht suggests he was passively giving advice to an out-of-state client when he
telephonically appearedat the February 3, 2014 meeting of the Company’s board. The Court finds
Pecht has unduly minimized his role in the meeting. During the course ofthat meeting, Pecht was
not quietly offering counsel behind the scenes. Rather, he was expressly advising his clients,
telling them they could “move forward” with the meeting over the objection of the Company’s
attorney. After the removal vote, he made comments aboutthe removalthat he specifically asked
to made part of the meeting’s formal record. Further, on February 21, 2014, Pecht personally
appeared at a hearing on Case No. 2263 in the Fulton County Superior Court wherein Sharpe
unsuccessfully sought a temporaryrestraining order enjoining the removal. The Court’s docket

reveals Pecht applied for admissionpro hacvice in that matter although the lawsuit was dismissed
before an order was entered on the application. See In re T. H., 319 Ga. App. 216, n. 7 (2013)
(“[a] Court may take judicial notice of records in the same court.”) The docket furtherreveals
Pecht’s name appeared on pleadings while that application was pending.
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The non-Sharpe

Plaintiffs allege, and Movants have not rebutted, Pecht and his law firm received $100,000 in

compensation from their Georgia clients for the legal work they performed regarding this Georgia
limited liability company.

(FAC, § 88; 256(h); Operating Agreement, $2.1.)

Based upontheir conduct andactivities both in and directed towards Georgia, the Court

finds the Movants were transacting business within the State. The Court furtherfindsthe first two
elements of the due process test have been met. Grieves. Asto the final elementof the due process
test, because the causes of action these movants nowfaceareso closely tied to their contacts with
the State, the Court finds it wouldnot offend traditional notionsof fair play and substantial justice
to subject Pecht andhis lawfirm to this Court’s personaljurisdiction. Id.
In light ofthe foregoing, it is hereby ORDEREDthat Gerard G. Pecht and Norton Rose
Fulbright US LLP’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction be DENIED.
3. ANTI-SLAPP MOTION FILED BY DEFENDANTS JOELLE C. SHARMAN
AND LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH, LLP

Defendants Joelle Sharman and Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP argue the claims
against them should bestricken as violating O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1, Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute.’
The non-SharpePlaintiffs contend Sharmanandherfirm wereinitially retained to defend Kellett,
Jr. in Case No. 1603, a lawsuit filed by Sharpe subsequentto his removal. (FAC, 121.) Sharman
avers Kellett, Jr. was an insured undera liability policy, and she was retained by the insurance
companyto defend Kellett, Jr. in Case No. 1603.8 Later, Sharmanand herfirm filed Case No.
2052 against Sharpe on behalf ofKellett, Jr. and the Company, and the Company waslater

7 O.C.G.A. § 9-1 1-L1.1 (d) provides for an expeditious resolution of an anti-SLAPP motionto strike. Here, the antiSLAPP motion was included aspart ofa larger motion seeking dismissal. Several other Defendantsalso filed motions
to dismiss in the same time frame. This posture, in addition to the delay caused by the judicial emergency orders
staying the case becauseofthe Covid-19 pandemic, led the Court to considerall the pending motionsat the sametime.
8 Defendants Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP’s and Joelle C. Sharman’s Brief in Support of Motionto
Dismiss and/or Strike Counts | through 5, and 12 of Plaintiffs’ Verified Complaint and Class Action for Damages
and MotionforBill of Peace,filed March 11, 2020, Ex. 7, 47.
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substituted as the sole plaintiffin that suit. (FAC, {J 122-123.) All claims against Sharman and
herfirm arise fromtheir role in this post-removallitigation involving Sharpe.
Specifically, the non-Sharpe Plaintiffs allege Sharman represented the Company despite
the knowledge that “Sharpe was not lawfully removed and she knew that Sharpe possessed the
right to select and control the Company’s legal counsel” under the Operating Agreement; that her
loyalties to Kellett, Jr. trumped the best interests of the Company; that she and Kellett, Jr. used
significant Company funds to defend his intentional misconduct whichconstituted theft from the
Company,and,finally, having filed the unauthorized lawsuit on behalf of the Company, “Sharman
threatened to file a false suit against Sharpe’s company. . . if Sharpe did not agree to settle his
lawsuit against Kellett, Jr.” (FAC, 9] 124-125, 256(1) and (m).)
““Strategic lawsuits against public participation’ or ‘SLAPPs’ are meritless lawsuits
brought not to vindicate legally cognizable rights, but instead to deter or punishthe exercise of
constitutionalrights of petition and free speechby tying uptheirtarget’s resources and driving up
the costs of litigation.” Wilkes v. McHugh, P.A. v. LTC Consulting, L.P., 306 Ga. 252, 257 (2019).

To accomplish it objectives of deterring SLAPP lawsuits, Georgia’s anti-SLAPPstatute “shall be
construed broadly.” O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(a). Georgia recently amendedits anti-SLAPPstatute.
In Wilkes, the Georgia Supreme Court noted the General Assembly’s revisions“substantially track
California’s anti-SLAPP procedures” and looked to California’s “considerable body of case law”
interpreting its version of the anti-SLAPP statute for guidancein construing Georgia’s similar law.

Id.
Ananti-SLAPP motionto strike is considered via a two-step process. O.C.G.A. § 9-1111.1(b). “In the first step, the defendant bringing an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss must make a
prima facie showing that the plaintiff's suit is subject to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1 by showing that
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the defendant’s challenged acts were taken in furtherance ofhis or herconstitutional rights of
petition or free speech in connection with an issue of public concern as defined bythe statute.”
Neff v. McGee, 346 Ga. App., 522, 524 (2018); O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b)(1).

Once that prima

facia case is made, “[t]he burden then shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that there is a
‘probability’ that he or she will prevail onhis or herclaims attrial. (Punctuation omitted.)” Id. In
making this determination a court mayconsiderthe pleadings as well as affidavits regarding the
facts upon which the disputed claimordefense rests. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b)(2).
In performing the initial step ofthe anti-SLAPPanalysis, “the critical consideration is
whetherthe cause ofactionis based onthe defendant's protected free speechorpetitioningactivity.
A defendants meetsits burden by demonstrating that the act underlying the challengedclaim could
reasonably be construed as fitting within one ofthe categories spelled out in subsection (c).
(Citations and punctuation omitted.)” Wilkes at 262. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(c)(1) expresslydefines
protected speechto include, “[a]ny written or oral statementor writing orpetition made before a
.. Judicial body ....” O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(c)(2) is more expansive. It defines protected speech
to include, “[a]ny written or oral statementorwriting orpetition made in connection with anissue
under consideration or review by a... judicial body... .”
Because all claims against Sharman and her lawfirm arise from the oral and written
statements they made before a judicial body orin connection with a judicial proceeding, the Court
finds they have madethe threshold showingthat the claims ofthe non-SharpePlaintiffs arise from
conduct protected by Georgia’s anti-SLAPPstatute. This interpretation was upheld in Navellier
v. Sletten, 29 Cal. 4!" 82, 52 P3d 703, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530 (2002) where litigant was sued because

of counterclaims hefiled against the plaintiff in a prior lawsuit. Because the purported SLAPP
lawsuit was basedentirely on actions takenin a lawsuit, the California Supreme Court foundthe
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threshold requirement was met. Id. at 90.

In Litinsky v. Kaplan, 40 Cal.App.5"" 970, 253 Ca.

Rptr. 3d 626 (2019), a plaintiff brought claims for malicious prosecution and intentionalinfliction
of emotional distress against an attorney andherclient arising fromtheir prosecution ofan earlier

lawsuit against plaintiff. The California appellate court upheldthe trial court’s decisionto strike
plaintiff's claims againstthe attorney underthe anti-SLAPP statute. Notably, in that case eventhe
plaintiff acknowledgedherclaimsarose fromthe attorney’s petitioning activity that was protected
underthe anti-SLAPPstatute.

Id. at 979, 253 Ca. Rptr. 3d at 633.

The non-Sharpe Plaintiffs argue the Movants’ interpretation of the anti-SLAPP statute is
so broad, “every case involving anattorneyrelated to a lawsuit would be subject to an anti-SLAPP
motion.”

Indeed, the statute does broadly define protected speech in the context of court

proceedings. Moreover,the statute expressly commandsthatit be “construed broadly.” 0.C.G.A,
§ 9-11-11.1(a). However, the statute is not so broad in its overall application because the second
step ofthe anti-SLAPP analysis provides a keyfiltering function.
Tosatisfy the secondprong, aplaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPP motion must state and
substantiate a legally sufficient claim. Put anotherway,the plaintiff must demonstrate that
the complaintis both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing
of facts to sustain a favorable judgmentif the evidence submitted bythe plaintiffis credited.
Weneither weighcredibility, nor compare the weight of the evidence. Rather, we accept
as true the evidence favorableto the plaintiff ... and evaluate the defendant's evidence only
to determineifit has defeated that submitted bytheplaintiff as a matteroflaw.(Internal
citations and punctuation omitted.)
RCO Legal, P.S.. Inc. v. Johnson, 347 Ga. App. 661, 667 (2018) citing Oasis West Realty, LLC
y. Goldman, 51 Cal.4th 811, 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 256, 250 P.3d 1115, 1120 (2011). As the Georgia

Supreme Court has recently recognized in Wilkes, “[oJnly a claimthatsatisfies bothprongs of

° Response in Opposition to Defendants Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP and Joelle C. Sharman’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint for Damagesand fora Bill of Peace, filed September30, 2020, p. 30.
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the anti-SLAPP statute —i.e., that arises from protected activity and lacks even minimal merit —
isa SLAPPthatis subject to being stricken. (Emphasis foundin original.) Id. at 262-263.
Accordingly, the non-Sharpe Plaintiffs must demonstrate there is a probability they may

prevail on the merits. With regardto this secondelement, the Court finds the non-SharpePlaintiffs
havefailed to discharge their burden. As will be addressedin detail, below, the Courtfinds it lacks

subject matterjurisdiction to considerthe claims of the non-SharpePlaintiffs in this direct action.
Moreover, the Court finds all the claims against Sharmanandher firm constitute abusive

litigation claims that fall exclusively within the ambit of Georgia’s abusive litigation statute,
O.C.G.A. § 51-7-80 ef seq. The non-Sharpe Plaintiffs allege Sharmanconspired with Kellett, Jr.,
“to weaponize the Companyagainst its lawful Managerbyfiling a false suit in the Company’s
nameagainst Sharpe . . . After using the Company, withoutauthority,to file suit against Sharpe,
Sharman threated to file a false suit against Sharpe’s [separate business entity]. . . if Sharpe did
not agreeto settle his lawsuit against Kellett, Jr.” (FAC, § 256 (1)-(m).)
O.C.G.A. § 51-7-81 establishesliability for abusivelitigation providing, “[a]ny person who
takes an active part in the initiation, continuation, or procurement ofcivil proceedings against
anothershall beliable for abusivelitigation if such personacts: (1) [w]ith malice; and (2) [w]ithout
substantial justification.” O.C.G.A. § 51-7-80(5) defines malice as “acting with ill will or for a
wrongful purpose and maybe inferred if . . . the party initiated, continued, or procured civil
proceedingsorprocess in a harassing mannerorused process for a purpose other than that of
securing the proper adjudicationofthe claim upon whichthe proceedings are based.” O.C.G.A. §
51-7-80(7) provides, a “civil proceeding, claim, defense, motion, appeal, or other position” lacks
substantial justification if it is: “(a) [f]rivolous; (B) [groundless in fact or in law; or (C)
[vJexatious.
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Courts should“look to the substance andnotthe style of a particular claim to determine
whether it amounts to a claim for abusive litigation.”

Meadow Springs Recovery, LLC. v.

Wofford, 319 Ga. App. 79, 82 (2012). Here, although denominated with other labels, the non-

Sharpe Plaintiffs contend they were harmedthrough these movants’ litigation efforts -- pursuing
claims, lodging defenses, and securing unmerited concessions from opponents in a lawsuit -- that
were performed maliciously and without substantial justification. The abusivelitigation statute
provides “the exclusive remedy for abusivelitigation” claims in Georgia such that the present
claims are foreclosed. O.C.G.A. § 51-7-85. Therefore, the Court finds the non-Sharpe Plaintiff
have failed to discharge their burden of demonstrating a probability they could prevail ontheir
claims against Sharmanand herfirmattrial.
In light of the foregoing, it is ORDEREDthat the Motionto Strike all the Non-Sharp
Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants Joelle Sharman and Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP

is GRANTED and suchclaims are STRICKENpursuant to O.C.G.A. §9-11-11.1. Sharpe has
lodged no claims against Sharman andherfirm, so that no additional claims remainagainst these
two movants.

4,

NON-SHARPE PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS: COUNTS1-8

Defendantsassert all claims of the non-SharpePlaintiffs are barred because they should be
pursuedin a derivative action. The Court agrees. In Patel v. 2602 Deerfield, LLC, 347 Ga. App.
880, 884 (2018) cert. denied (Jul. 1, 2019), the Georgia Court of Appeals reiterated the factors

distinguishing derivative from direct actions.
A derivative suit is brought on behalf of a corporation for harm doneto it and any damages
recovered are paid to the corporation. And the determination of whether a claim is
derivative or direct is made by looking to what the pleader alleged. Importantly, it is the
nature of the wrong alleged and not the pleader's designation or stated intention that
controls the court's decision. Nonetheless, the general rule is that allegations of
misappropriation of corporate assets and breachof fiduciary duty can only be pursued in a
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shareholderderivative suit brought on behalf ofthe corporation, because the injury is to
the corporation andits shareholders collectively. (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Here, the disputes raised by the non-Sharpe Plaintiffs -- misappropriation ofcorporate assets and
breaches offiduciary duty -- are classic questions that generally must be pursued in a derivative
action. Id.; see also Rollins v. LOR, Inc., 345 Ga. App. 832, 853 (2018); Barnett v. Fullard, 306
Ga. App. 148, 152 (2010). The non-Sharpe Plaintiffs also make claims the Company’s board of
directors did not follow the appropriate procedures outlined in the Operating Agreement whenit
voted to remove Sharpe. Georgia courts have founddisputes arising from corporate elections and
voting procedures also present derivative claims. In Crittenton v. Southland Owners Ass’n, Inc.,
312 Ga. App. 521 (2011), an issue arose whether a homeowners association properly conducted

anelectionforits board of directors. The Court of Appeals found this dispute was derivative in
nature, determining whetherthe association,
employed the proper election-voting procedures [under its governing documents] is
essentially a claim that defendants breachedtheirfiduciary duties to the [association] and
all of its members. Indeed, election procedures properly conducted in accordancewith[the
corporate governing documents] benefit all members; just as election irregularities harm
all the members ofa corporation. (Citation omitted.)
Id. at 524; see also Practice Benefits, LLC. v. Entera Holdings, LLC, 340 Ga. App. 378, 381

(2017)(‘the right to proper election procedures inures to the benefit of all [limited liability
company] members”).

O.C.G.A. §§ 14-11-801 and 802 establish the pre-requisites for a member to pursue a
derivative action against a limited liability company.

Generally these include a written demand

by a memberof the company providing its management with notice of the dispute and an
opportunity to take action on the company’s behalf.

Id.

[fa derivative action is required, the

failure to comply with these pre-requisites leaves a court without subject matterjurisdiction to hear
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the dispute. Georgia Appreciation Prop., Inc. v. Enclave at Riverwalk TownhomeAss’n,Inc., 345
Ga. App. 413, 414 (2018) (physical precedent only)(“‘a dismissal for failure to meet a procedural
prerequisite to filing suit, such as a failure to make a demand in connection with a derivativesuit,
is a dismissal due to a lack of subject matterjurisdiction’). Here, the non-Sharpe Plaintiffs do not
dispute their failure to comply with these pre-requisites.

Rather, they claimto fall within two

recognized exceptions where a direct actionis permitted in lieu of a derivative action.
The first such exception applies to a plaintiff who has incurred a special injury. “[A]
shareholder has standing to bring a direct action, seeking recovery onbehalf of the shareholder
individually, if the suit alleges a special injury separate and distinct fromthat suffered by other
shareholders, or alleges a wrong involving a shareholdercontractualright existing apart from any
right of the corporation.”

Barnett at 152. Here, the non-Sharpe Plaintiffs’ claims of a special

injury are undercut bythe allegations they make in aneffort to serve asclass representatives for
the Company’s other minority members. In that regard, the non-Sharpe Plaintiffs admit their
“claims are typical” of other minority members who were “comparably injured through the
uniform misconduct” described in the non-Sharpe Plaintiffs’ complaint. (FAC, § 154.)
The non-Sharpe Plaintiffs have also argued they all signed the Operating Agreement in
their individual capacities as members suchthat, “each has a cause of action forthose violations,”

thereby suggesting some formof special injury.'°

As directed by Patel, this Court looks to the

“nature of the wrong alleged” in determining whethera claim is derivative. Here, any breach of
the removal provisions of the Operating Agreement harmedall of the minority shareholders in

'0 Response in Opposition to Defendants Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP and Joelle Sharman’s Motionto
Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint for Damages and Motion for a Bill of Peace, filed September30.

2020, p. 9.

Page 20 of 33

precisely the same wayand createdno special injury to any one of themthat wasdistinct from the
injury suffered by the Company.
Similarly, the non-Sharpe Plaintiffs have alleged fraud against three defendants, Kellett,
Jr, Ohanian, a board member who voted for Sharpe’s removal, and Joseph, the Company’s
attorney. (FAC, {{] 221-229.) These three Defendants purportedly made misrepresentations to the
minority owners that Sharpe had beenproperly removed. (FAC, § 222.) Thesefraud allegations
stemfromstatements made in “the immediate aftermath [of Sharpe’s removal] to quell the anxiety
and questions from the Minority Owners.” (FAC, { 224.) Again, looking at the nature of the
alleged wrong, the non-SharpePlaintiffs assert they and all of the other minority members were
similarly harmed bythis alleged fraud suchthat the Court finds it caused no specialinjury.

The non-Sharpe Plaintiffs cite TMX Finance, LLC v. Goldsmith, 352 Ga. App. 190 (2019)
as setting forth a new and “notable exception”to the derivative action requirement.''

While

Goldsmith also concerned a struggle for control of a limitedliability company, it was factually
inapposite. In Goldsmith, the two controlling members claimed theylost controlto the company’s
founder. The Court of Appeals determined these two members could maintain a direct action
because the founder’s alleged fraud and breachoffiduciary duty were “targeted at them”and their
“alleged harm was different from that experienced” by the companyandits minority members.
Id. at 198. There is nothing new about Goldsmith. It is merely an applicationof the special injury
exception that has long existed in Georgia law.

Forall the above reasons, the Court finds the non-SharpePlaintiffs have incurred no special
injury that would allow themto avoid the statutory pre-requisites of a derivativeaction.

* Response in Opposition to Defendant Artoush Ohanian’s Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint, filed September 30, 2020, pp. 25-26.
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Underthe second exception,“a direct action may be properin the context of a closely held
corporation where circumstances show that the reasonsfor the general rule requiring a derivative

suit do not apply.” Barnett at 152. This exceptionfirst arose in Thomasv. Dickson, 250 Ga. 772
(1983) where a one-third minority shareholder sued the two majority shareholders for

misappropriation of corporate funds. The Georgia Supreme Court first consideredthe four reasons
underlying the requirementfora derivative action:
(1) It prevents a multiplicity of lawsuits by shareholders;
(2) it protects corporate creditors by putting the proceeds of recovery back into the
corporation;
(3) it protects the interests ofall shareholders by increasing the value oftheir shares,
instead ofallowing a recovery by one shareholderto prejudice the rights of others not
a partyto the suit; and
(4) it adequately compensates the injured shareholderby increasing the value of his shares.

It then reasoned Thomas presented an “exceptional situation” where none of these “realistic
objectives”of the derivative action requirement were being servedsuchthata direct action should
be permitted.

Id. at 774. Subsequent case lawclarified this exception applies to both statutory

close corporations created pursuant O.C.G.A. § 14-2-901 ef seg. as well as non-statutory close
corporations so long as “the exceptional circumstances found in [Thomas]are present.” Stokery,
Bellemeade, LLC, 272 Ga. App. 817, 823 (2005) rev’d in part on other grounds Bellemeade, LLC

y. Stoker, 280 Ga. 635 (2006); see also Telcom Cost Consulting, Inc. v. Warren, 275 Ga. App.
830, 834-835 (2005). Further case lawhasheld that all four of the underlying reasons supporting
the requirementof a derivative action must be met in order for the Thomas exceptionto apply.
Patel at n. 26.

Here, the Court does not find United Sciences is a closely held corporation that would
qualify for the Thomas exception. The Court has been unable to locate any specific parameters of
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what Georgia considers to be a closely held corporation notcreated in accordance with O.C.G.A.
§ 14-2-901 ef seg.

Generally, commentators have recognized the common lawdefinition of a

closely held corporation includes, “corporations with a small numberofstockholders, where there
is no ready market for the corporation’s shares, andall or a substantial majority of the stockholders
participate in the management,direction, andoperationsofthe corporation.” When is Corporation
Close, or Closely-Held, Corporation Under CommonorStatutory Law, 111 A.L.R.Sth 207, § 2(a)
(2003). Here, the Company does not meetthefirst or final factor of this generally recognizedtest.
As to the first factor, in their allegations seekingstatus as class representatives, the nonSharpe Plaintiffs assert the numberofnon-party minority membersis “so numerous that individual
joinder of all the membersis impractical.” (FAC, { 152.) While they offer no definite number,
the non-Sharpe Plaintiffs estimate at least forty-nine minority owners would comprise the class
which does not include several other minority owners who were excluded by the non-Sharpe
Plaintiffs’ definition.

(FAC, §§] 150-152.)

Reviewing the allegations of the First Amended

Complaint, the Company has approximately sixty owners. (Id.)

Asto the final factor, a general

reading of the pleadings reflect that most members of the Company played no role inits
management. Notably, the Operating Agreement expressly provides the Company is managermanaged withlimited powers accordedto its board of directors. (Operating Agreement, § 6.1.)
Evenif the Court were to assume the Companywasa closely held corporation and conduct
the Thomasanalysis, the large numberof non-party owners prevents the non-SharpePlaintiffs
from satisfying its first prong -- demonstrating their direct action would prevent a multiplicity of
lawsuits.

In Barnett, the trial court’s dismissal of a shareholder’s direct action claims for

misappropriation of corporate assets and falsification of corporate records was affirmed.

In

evaluating whether the Thomas exception applied, the Georgia Court of Appeals found,
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“[slignificantly, notall ofthe [closely held corporation’s] shareholders are parties to this suit. As
such, there is a risk of multiple suits and of possible prejudice to the rights of the other
shareholders. This exception permitting a directactionin the contextof a closely held corporation,
therefore, cannot be applied in this case.” Id. at 153; see also Levy v. Reiner, 290 Ga. App. 471,

474 (2008)(the Thomasexception did not apply because someshareholders were not parties to the
lawsuit). By contrast, in Thomas, all three shareholders were parties to the lawsuit. The nonSharpe Plaintiffs rely heavily on another case applying the Thomas exception, Ralph v Whetsell,
2014 WL 12284029 * 2 - *3 (N.D. Ga. May 28, 2014). However, Ralph concerneda statutory
closely held corporation with only four shareholders, and they wereall parties to the suit. !2
Here, any ability of this direct action to prevent a multiplicity of lawsuits hinges on the
non-SharpePlaintiffs’ claims for class action relief. The Court does not find this sufficient to
satisfy the first prong of Thomas. The non-Sharpe Plaintiffs have offered no support forthis
unique argument. In reviewing O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23, the Georgia statute governing class action
relief, the Court finds no guarantee the non-Sharpe Plaintiffs would be certified as class
representatives capable of securingrelieffor the entire class. See O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-23(a), (b), (c)
and (f)(3). Moreover, should the class be certified, any of its members are given the statutory
ability to opt out of the class and could presumably pursue their own action. O.C.G.A. § 9-1123(c)(2). It is far fromcertainthis direct action would preventfuture lawsuits on these sameissues.
In sum, should the Thomasanalysis apply, the present dispute does not constitute one of
the “exceptional circumstances” meriting a deviation from the derivative action requirement.
' See also Stoker (Thomas exception applied where all three members of the corporation were parties to the direct
action); Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 286 Ga. App. 61, 65 (Thomas exception applied where the only two shareholders
were parties to the direct action); compare Parks v. Multimedia Technologies, Inc., 239 Ga. App. 282, 287
(1999)(Thomas exception applied whenthe only non-party shareholders were members of one litigant’s immediate
family and nothing in the record suggested they had complaints about the management issues in dispute); Dunaway
y. Parker, 215 Ga. App. 841, 846 (1994)(Thomas exception applied when the only non-party shareholders were one
party’s wife, children and mother).
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Finally, the non-Sharpe Plaintiffs argue the derivative action prerequisite for a written
demand on the Company would be meaningless based onthese facts. Before addressing these
arguments, the Court notes Georgia has soundly rejected claims that derivative action demand
requirements may be ignored even though they mightprovefruitless. See Pinnacle Benning LLC.
yv. Clark Realty Capital, LLC, 314 Ga. App. 609, 616 (2012) (statute establishing the derivative
action demand requirementforlimitedliability corporations has no futility exception, and “wewill
not judicially create a futility exception out of whole cloth.”). Pinnacle Benning suggests any
request to ignore the otherwise applicable statutory demand requirements should be carefully
scrutinized.
First, the non-Sharpe Plaintiffs contend Sharpe remains the Company’s Managerbecause
his removal was improperly performed.

(FAC, JJ 160-161.) Indeed, acting in his purported

capacity as manager, Sharpe directed the Company to sign as a plaintiff in this action."
Accordingly, the non-Sharpe Plaintiffs claim there is no need for them to lodge a demandonthe
Company’s management to take action because the Company’s rightful manager supports this
action. The Court is not persuaded by this “chicken and the egg” argument. On one hand, the
non-Sharpe Plaintiffs seek the Court to issue declaratory relief, determining whether Sharpe
remains the Company’s manager while onthe other they ask the Court to ignore the derivative
action demand requirement because Sharpe is the Company’s rightful Manager. This argument

provides no basis to avoid the derivative action demand requirement.
Also, the non-Sharpe Plaintiffs contend the prerequisite statutory demand should not be

enforced because it could serve to underminetheir claims. The non-Sharpe Plaintiffs fear any

'3 Response in Opposition to Defendants Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP and Joelle C. Sharman’s Motion to
DismissPlaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint for Damages and MotionforBill of Peace, filed September 30, 2020,
p. 14.
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formal demand made upon a managerotherthan Sharpe would be used against them as some form

of admissionagainst their interest.'* The non-Sharpe Plaintiffs have not supported this argument
with any legal authority. The Court is not convincedthat by simply complying with the statutory
mandate for a written demand,informingthe person whois currently acting as managerthat several
membersofthe corporation dispute he was properly appointed as manager, could be considered
as any type of harmful admission by the non-SharpePlaintiffs that would justify ignoring the
statute’s demand requirement.
In light ofthe foregoing, it is ORDEREDand adjudged that all claims ofthe non-Sharpe
Plaintiffs are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE." It is further ORDERED thatthis ruling
renders the non-SharpePlaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment ontheir claim for declaratory
relief MOOT.

5. SHARPE’S CLAIMS: COUNTS9-12
Sharpe has brought four counts against lawyers andtheir respective law firms. One of
these lawyers, Joseph, drafted the Operating Agreement and was the Company’s counsel until
Sharpe fired him onthe brink of the removal meeting. After Sharpe’s removal, he is alleged to
have assisted Kellett, Jr. in making an unauthorized amendment to the Company’s articles of
organization.

The other lawyer, Smith, sent Sharpe a demandletter seeking the return of a

Companylaptop computerafter the removal. Healso represented the Company against Sharpe in
someofthelitigation following his removal. Because Sharpe has alleged special injuries, he is
not required to pursue his claims in a direct action unlike the non-Sharpe Plaintiffs. Barnett.
However, the Court finds other argumentsrequire dismissal ofhis claims.

"Id.

'S Crittenden v. Crittenden, 345 Ga. App. 672, n. 2 (2020)(“a dismissal for lack ofsubject matterjurisdiction is not
a ruling on the merits and such dismissal is without prejudice”).
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As outlined above, Sharpe has filed and voluntarily dismissed five prior actions
contesting his removal as Manager.

Sharpe has named eachofthese lawyers andtheir lawfirms

in at least oneofhis prioractions. See n. 5, supra. Inlight of Sharpe's prior voluntary dismissals,
the Court finds his current action is barred by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41.

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(a)(3) provides a voluntary dismissal is generally without prejudice,
“except that the filing of a second notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication ofthe merits.”
The two-dismissal rule found in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(a) has “res judicata effect” in that it allows
the voluntary dismissal to serve as a judgmenton the merits,thus fulfilling one of the res judicata
requirements. See O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40; see also Global Ship Sys.. LLC. V. Riverhawk Grp.. LLC,
334 Ga. App. 860, 864 (2015); Belco Elec.. Inc. v. Bush, 204 Ga. App. 811, 813 (1992),

In Walker v. Mecca, 320 Ga. App. 142 (2013), a similar case involving multiple
voluntarydismissals, passengers injured in an automobile accident voluntarily dismissed theirfirst
action against the driver of the othercar, voluntarily dismissed their second action against the
driver oftheir car, and filed a third action naming the drivers of both cars. The third action was

dismissed bythe trial court, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the two dismissal rule
“applies when anaction seeking recovery on the same claim was brought and dismissed twice,

regardless of the parties namedas defendants.” Id. at 143.
In Global Ship, the Georgia Court of Appeals further expoundedon Rule 41, providing
a plaintiff cannot escape the application of the two-dismissal rule by changing which defendants
are added to subsequentcases orby addingplaintiffs or claims to subsequentsuits. In Global Ship,
Plaintiffs sought to stop pending foreclosure by a lender, claiming lenderactedin badfaith when
it declared the loan in default. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed theirfirst action without prejudice.
Plaintiffs then brought a second action, broaderthan the first, addressing several aspects of the
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complex financing at issue and including additional plaintiffs and defendants as well as new
claims.

Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the second action without prejudice.

Plaintiffs then

brought a third action, contending it was a renewal of the second action. Pursuant to the two
dismissalrule, the trial court entered summary judgment onthird action which wasthenaffirmed
onappeal.
Asto the additionalplaintiffs who joined in the second action (suchthat the third action
wasreally their second action), the Court of Appeals reasoned, “in instances in which multiple

plaintiffs filed multiple actions and dismissals, the relevant inquiry is whether any of the
[plaintiffs] was a plaintiff who voluntarily dismissed both actions. (Emphasis found in original.)”
Id. at 862.

As to the additional claims lodged in the second action which were renewed in the

third action, the Court of Appeals looked to the law of res judicata and found the new claimsdid
not save the third action from dismissal because they concerned the same conductat issue in the
original complaint.
The binding sinew betweeneachof the three actions is the apparently complexinitial
financing for, and subsequent failure of, the Global Ship shipyard. In fact, as shown by
its allegations, all of Global Ship's causes of action from eachofits three civil actions
may betraced toits initial financing and activities associated with its financing. To
preserve causes of action from res judicata, one must assert all claims for relief
concerning the same subject matter in one lawsuit and any claims forrelief concerning
that same subject matter which are not raised will be res judicata pursuant to OCGA §
9-12-40. [Cit.] This was not done.

Id. at 864-865.
Here Sharpe has voluntarily dismissed numerous prior actions involving this same
subject. Like Global Ship, regardless of the addition of Plaintiffs and Defendants and claims, the

“binding sinew”of all these actions concern his removal. The Court finds Sharpe’s arguments
about the inapplicability of the two dismissal rule to be unavailing.
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Alternatively, the Court finds other reasonsthat require the dismissal of Sharpe’s claims
against these lawyer defendants. The parties do not dispute the aiding and abetting as well as the
conspiracy claims Sharpe lodgesare analyzedin the same mannerastortious interference claims.!®
See Insight Technologyv. Freight Check, LLC, 280 Ga. App. 19 (2006). Thefirst element of any
such claim is whether, through improper action or wrongful conduct and without privilege, the
defendants sought to procure a breachof the primary wrongdoer’s fiduciary duty to or contractual
obligations regarding the plaintiff. Id. at 25.

Georgia courts have held that one whois acting

“without privilege” must be an “intermeddler orstranger to the business relationship at issue.”
ASC Const. Equipment USA,Inc. v. City Commercial Real Estate, Inc., 303 Ga. App. 309, 313
(2010).

The Georgia Supreme Court has expressly endorsed line of opinions seekingto limit

the reach of tortious interference liability by more narrowly defining those who constitute
“strangers” to a contract or business relationship. Atlanta Market Ctr. Mgmt. Co. v. McLane, 269
Ga. 604 (1998).

Here, the Court finds neither of the attorneys Sharpe has named as Defendants

are properly considered strangers to the Operating Agreement or Sharpe’s business relationship
with the Company.
Joseph drafted the Operating Agreement, and he served as Company counsel.
Moreover, he owned 1.34% of the Company such that the stranger doctrine would not apply.
(FAC, P 150.) See ULQ, LLC v. Meder, 293 Ga. App. 176, 184 (2008) (notortiousliability for a
10% ownerofa limited liability corporation as he was nota strangerto the business relationship
or contracts). As for Smith, Georgia law provides,“an attorney who on behalf ofa client asserts
or prosecutes a claim arising from contractual rights or duties is not a stranger to such contract . .

‘5 For purposesof this alternate ruling, the Court assumesbut does not decide thatthe claims were brought within
the appropriate statute of limitations. Across multiple motions, the parties have disputed whether the appropriate
statute for these aiding and abetting and conspiracy to breachfiduciary duty claimsis four years or six years.
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. so that a claimof tortious interference will not lie against him orhis partners.” Hyre v. Denise,
214 Ga. App. 552, 555 (1994). Hyre wascited favorably by the Georgia Supreme Court in the
seminal Atlanta Market Center case.

Id. at 608.

Further, any claim regarding Smith’s representation of United Sciencesinlitigationis
barred by Georgia’s abusivelitigation statute O.C.G.A. § 51-7-80 ef seq., discussed above in
relation to the anti-SLAPP motiontostrike.
In light of the foregoing, it is ORDERED and adjudgedthatall of Sharpe's claims are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
6. BILL OF PEACE AGAINST SHARPE
In light of Sharpe’s extensivelitigation history, certain Defendants seek a bill of peace
barring Sharpe fromfiling anyfurthersuits against them concerning his removal.'7 All of the
Defendants seekingthis relief have previously been sued by Sharpe with regard to the removal.

O.C.G.A. § 23-3-110 states:
(a) It being the interest ofthis state that there shall be an endoflitigation, equity will
entertaina bill of peace:
(1) To confirm some right which has beenpreviously satisfactorily established by
more thanonelegaltrial andis likely to belitigated again;
(2) To avoid a multiplicity of actions by establishing a right, in favorofor against
several persons, whichis likely to be the subject of legal controversy; or
(3) In other similar cases.

(b) Asancillaryto this jurisdiction, equity will grant perpetual injunctions.
In light of Sharpe’s repeatedlegalfilings and multiple voluntary dismissals, the Court finds a bill
ofpeace to be warranted.

'7 Defendants Joelle C. Sharman and Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP sought a bill of peace but orally

withdrewtheir request during the October 26, 2020 hearing.
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Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that Wess Eric Sharpe is perpetually enjoined from filing
any future pleading or legal action against Defendants Gerard G. Pecht; Norton Rose Fulbright
US, LLP; Michael R. Smith, or

King & Spalding, LLP arising or stemming from their

representation of Samuel B. Kellett, Jr. or United Sciences, LLC as concerns Sharpe’s removal

and/or termination as a Manager, Director or CEO of United Sciences, LLC unless and until: (1)
Sharpe obtains written approval from the Chief Judge of the Superior Court of Fulton County
permitting suchfiling and (2) said written approval is attached to any legal filing so permitted.
Should Sharpe make any legal filing subject to this injunction without fulfilling these two
conditions, said Defendants will be under no obligation to respond and the pleading or complaint
shall be subject to immediate dismissal. See Rolleston Living Trust v. Kennedy, 277 Ga. 541

(2004). This bill of peace shall extend to anyone who maybe in privity with Sharpe.

SO ORDERED,this_/¥ day of Merefizq2020.
»

}

-x

Moen

sor J. GOGER, SENIOR JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Business Case Division
Atlanta Judicial Circuit

Electronically served uponregistered service contacts through eFileGA
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